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Case No. 8073 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE S. RIN·GWOOD, HAROLD 
T. RINGWOOD, LUELLA DUNCAN 
and ESTHER JANE OS·WALD, 
R E S,l)t;l/ DEN r..s -r Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LOTTIE S·. BRADF:ORD·, also known 
as Lottie Bradford White, 
A/) PIE" t,.t. A-1'1 r-1 Defendant. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIF'FS AND RESPONDENTS, 
___ , ....... 
---ci~~~:s._;;~~~;;;-c:; LAWRENCE L. SUMMERHAYS, 
Attorney for Respondents. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE S. RINGWOOD, HAROLD 
T. RINGWOOD·, LUELLA DUNCAN 
and ESTHER JANE OS·WALD, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LOTTIE S. BRADF·ORD, also known 
as Lottie Bradford White, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 
8073 
BRIEF OF' PLAINTIF'FS AND RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF F'ACTS 
For the most part the facts set forth by the appellant 
in his brief are correct but do not present the situation 
in full from the respondents standpoint. We will there-
fore make our own statement of the facts as we deem 
them material to our presentation of the case. 
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Plaintiffs brought an action of ejectment in the Dis-
trict Court of Salt Lake County to require defendant to 
remove her cabin from the property of the plaintiffs. 
Judgment was granted in favor of the plaintiffs and 
defendant has filed this appeal clai1ning title to the 
property on which the cabin was located by virtue of the 
doctrine of establishing a boundary by acquiescence. 
The only question presented by this appeal 1s 
whether or not under the facts presented the trial courts 
finding that the doctrine of the e·stablishment of a 
boundary by acquiescence was inapplicable, was proper. 
The plaintiffs and the defendant are adjoining prop-
erty owners of real property located in Emigration Can-
yon in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Plaintiffs' East 
boundary and defendant's West boundary are common 
to both pieces of property (P ex. 1, R. 21). The plaintiffs' 
predecessors in title were their parents, William H. Ring-
wood and Julia E. Ringwood (R. 26, P ex. 1). William H. 
Ringwood purchased part of the property in about 1921 
(P ex. 2), and one .lot at a later date (R. 66, 72), and con-
veyed all the property to Julia E. Ringwood, his wife, on 
January 3, 1935, a few days before his death (P ex.l). 
Julia E. Ringwood conveyed the property to Ethel J. Os-
wald, one of the plaintiffs herein in 1940, who in turn 
conveyed an undivided 14 interest to each of the other 
plaintiffs in February of 1949 (P ex. 1). 
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3 
rrhe predecessor in title of the defendant was her 
daughter \vho acquired title in about 1935 (R. 44). 
Defendant's daughter received the property as a gift 
fro1n her father, Lionel Bradford, an attorney, who 
acquired the property for work he had done (R. 47, 48). 
His na1ne, however, does not appear in the chain of title. 
Defendant acquired the property in 1948 from her 
daughter (R. 56). 
In 1923 William H. Ringwood, with the assistance of 
J. T. Oswald, one of the witnesses for plaintiffs, was 
building a cabin on his property and had also just planted 
some young Boxelder trees. In order to keep the sheep 
then grazing in Emigration Canyon from destroying the 
Boxelder trees, Mr. Oswald, in that year, at William H. 
Ringwood's direction, built a barbed wire fence, (R. 61) 
without any attempt whatever to put the fence on a 
boundary line. The fence was erected from a point on a 
steep bank of Emigration Canyon stream in a general 
Northerly direction (R. 62, Def. ex. 10). It did not reach 
to the South property line, being about 80 feet north of 
it (R . .J-1) nor did it reach to the North property line of 
Ringwoods property (R. 72- 73). 
At the time of the construction of the fence, Mr. 
Ringwood was buying three lots. Sometime after the 
fence was constructed, additional property East of the 
three lots was purchased (R·. 66, 72), but the fence was 
never changed from its original position (R. 15, 66, 72). 
William H. Ringwood knew that the fence was not on the 
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4 
property line (R. 67) and he told his son-in-law, Dr. 
Halgren, that the fence ran North and South, while the 
line was on an angle. 
In the late summer of 1933, Mr. Ringwood suffered 
a heart attack and 1noved into Salt Lake City and never 
went to the property again (R. 67, 30). 
In 1934 during 1fr. Ringwood's absence, Mr. Brad-
ford built a cabin on part of the property presently in 
dispute, all of which cabin except for possibly a corner 
of the porch on the Northeast corner, rests entirely on 
property deeded to plaintiffs ( R. 21, D &.x. 10). Defend-
ant's cabin remained in its original location without 
objection upon the part of the plaintiffs until a survey 
was made for the plaintiffs about two years before trial 
when they were trying to sell their property and when 
it was first discovered by plaintiffs that defendant's 
cabin occupied the plaintiffs' property (R .. 27, 28). 
Margaret Bradford Pitts was the owner of the prop-
erty at the time the cabin was built and until about 1948 
(R. 56). She testified that she did not go up to the cabin 
more than once or twice each summer, that her father 
selected the site of the cabin and that 8he did not know 
whether the site was selected because it was a nice flat 
area or because it was on her property (R. 48, 49). She 
further testified that she had never had a conversation 
with any member of the Ringwood family relative to the 
fence line (R. 46) and that the Ringwoods did not occupy 
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5 
their property up to the fence line (R. 46). Witnesses 
for the plaintiffs also testified that the property was 
never occupied by plaintiffs or their predecessors up to 
or even near the fence line (R. 31, 70) and that they did 
not know what the defendant clairned or what they were 
doing with respect to the property East of the fence 
line (R·. 75, 76, 28). 
The Eastern part of the plaintiffs' property is cov-
ered with ·brush and trees and the stakes put in on the 
original survey were not visible without going to the 
immediate point of the stake (R. 75). In fact, the East 
half of the Ringwood property was r-'-ot used, for any 
purpose (R. 70). 
There is no evidence in the record of any conversa-
tion or dispute between the respective property owners 
or of any dispute or conversation concerning the bound-
ary until after the survey made at the· request of the 
plaintiffs approximately two years prior to the filing 
of this action. 
From a decree in the trial court ordering the defend-
ant to remove her cabin within 30 days, the defendant 
has filed this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE 
FENCE WAS NOT USED OR INTENDED AS A BOUNDARY 
FENCE BY RESPONDENTS, AND PROPER_LY FOUND 
THAT THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE 
WAS INAPPLICABLE UNDER THE FACTS OF THE CASE. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE 
FENCE WAS NOT USED OR INTENDED AS A BOUNDARY 
FENCE BY RESPONDENTS, AND PROPERLY FOUND 
THAT THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE 
WAS INAPPLICABLE UNDER THE FACTS OF THE CASE. 
Counsel for defendant contends that the fence con-
structed on the Ringwood property in 1923 to keep the 
sheep out of the trees and shrubbery planted there was 
acquiesced in and adopted as a boundary line between 
the plaintiffs' and defendant's property. 
In the case of Tripp vs. Bagley, 74 U. 57, 276 P. 912, 
the Court, on page 916 citing the following cases: Holmes 
v. Judge, 31 Utah 269,87 P. 1009; Moyer v. Langton, 37 
Utah 9, 106 P. 509; Rydalch v. Anderson, 37 Utah 99, 107 
P. 25; Young v. Hyland, 37 Utah 229, lOS P. 1124; Fa:rr 
v. Thomas, 41 Utah 1, 122 P. 906; Binford v. Eccles, 
41 Utah 457, 126· P. 333; Christensen v. Beutler, 42 Utah 
392, 131 P. 666; Tanner v. Stratton, 44 Utah 253, 139 P. 
940; Warren v. M azzuchi, 45 Utah 612, 148 P. 360 ; Van 
Cott v. C.asper, 53 Utah 161, 176 P. 849, stated: 
"In these cases the rule is announced and 
reiterated that, where the owners of adjoining 
lands occupy their respective premises up to a 
certain line which they mutually recognize as the 
boundary line for a long period of time, they and 
their grantees may not deny that the boundary 
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7 
line thus recognized is the true one. The general 
rule thus repeatedly enunciated has become the 
settled law in this jurisdiction." 
Again in the case of Brown v. Milliner, Utah 1951, 
232 P. 2, 202 at Page 207, our Court says: 
~'we have further held in this state that in the 
absence of evidence that the owners of adjoining 
property or their predecessors in interest ever 
expressly agreed as to the location of the bound-
ary between then1, if they have occupied their 
respective premises up to an open boundary line 
visibly marked by monuments, fences, or build-
ings, for a long period of time and mutually 
recognized it as the dividing line between them, 
the law will imply an agreement fixing the bound-
ary. as located if it can do so consistently with the 
facts appearing, and will not permit the parties 
nor their grantees to depart from said line." 
In the instant case there is not mutual recognition 
of the fence line as the boundary line nor did the plain-
tiffs and their predecessors occupy their premises up to 
the fence line at all, which fact was testified to by wit-
nesses for both plaintiffs and defendant. Defendant's 
daughter, who owned the cabin and land adjacent to the 
plaintiffs' land at the time the cabin was built and up 
until 1948, when she conveyed it to the defendant, testi-
fied that the plaintiffs did not occupy their property to 
the fence line and that she had never had a conversation 
with anyone of the Ringwood family relative to the fence 
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line. She testified that she didn't know very Inuch about 
them and only went to the cabin once or twice in the 
summer months. 
Dr. Halgren, a witness for the plaintiffs and the 
husband of a deceased daughter of William H. Ringwood, 
testified that he had a cabin on the Ringwood property 
and lived in the same for several years prior to 1934, and 
visited it on occasion after William Ringwood's death 
and that the East half of the Ringwood property was 
never used for any purpose. Harold Ringwood, who lived 
in the Ringwood cabin during the years 1940 to about 
1946, testified that he did not occupy the Ringwood prop-
erty even close to the fence line. George Ringwood, one 
of the plaintiffs, also· testified that they did not go near 
the Bradford property. 
The case of Glenrn v. Whitney, Utah 1949, 209, Pac. (2), 
257 is in many respects in point in this case. In that 
case a third party, a predecessor in interest to plaintiff, 
built a fence between the pToperty, subsequently acquired 
by plaintiff and defendant, but actually lying upon the 
plaintiff's property, to prevent the escape of the third 
party's livestock from the third party's property; sub-
sequently, the defendants and their predecessors culti-
vated the property up to the fence, always assuming that 
they owned to the fence line. The plaintiff apparently 
did nothing about the fence line or use the land up to the 
fence line. In the trial court, the parties were held to 
have acquiesced in the fence as a boundary and the 
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defendant \Yas given judgment. In reversing the judg-
ment on appeal our court stated, comrnencing on Page 
260: 
"The cases and text writers in stating the 
general rule announce the principle that the ques-
tion as to whether an established fence line has 
becorne the true boundary line separating two 
adjoining tracts of land is one of fact and the 
court must evaluate the facts in each case. Before 
doing so, we find it necessary to define the mean-
ing of certain terms in view of the fact that there 
seems to be some confusion in the minds of the 
litigants as to what elements are necessary to 
establish a boundary line in a suit of this charac-
ter. If it was not clear before the case of Tripp v. 
Bagley, 7-! Utah 57, 276 P. 912, 69 A.L.R. 1417, it 
was expressly recognized there and in all Utah 
cases in point handed down subsequent to it, see 
Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah 
208, 141 P. 2d 160; and Smith v. Nelson, Utah, 
197 P.2d 132, that there must be some uncertainty 
or a dispute between adjoining owners as to the 
location of the true boundary line before a fence 
which they subsequently erect to resolve their 
differences and in which they acquiesce for a long 
period of time, may be taken as the agreed 
boundary line. Using the terms "uncertainty" and 
"dispute" loosely, we might say that the parties 
here were uncertain as to the location of the 
boundary line inasmuch as neither of them had 
attempted to locate it prior to the survey made 
by plaintiff. This, however, is not "uncertainty" 
as this term wa.s meant to be used in this connec-
tion for as is said in Thompson on Real Property, 
section 3309 : 
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"'If an owner ignorant of his true boundaries 
by n1istake acquiesces in a line as a boundary, he 
and his grantees are not thereby precluded fro1n 
afterwards claiming to the true line, and it has 
been held that one who has no knowledge that the 
adjoining owner has encroached upon his land 
cannot be held to have lost his rights by acquies-
cence in sueh occupancy no matter how long con-
tinued, for one cannot waive or acquiesce in a 
wrong while ignorant that it has been committed, 
especially where each party has equal means of 
ascertaining the correct line.' 
"Thus, lack of knowledge as to the location 
of the true boundary is not synonymous with 
uncertainty. This being true, it cannot be said 
that the parties here were uncertain as to the 
location of the true boundary line, for there is 
nothing in the record before us to indicate that 
either of them had any idea as to the true location 
of the boundary line apart from an assumption 
that some existing fences separating the lands 
of other owners in the area might make the section 
lines. 
"Furthermore, the fence was not erected to 
settle any uncertainty or dispute between the liti-
gants or their predecessors in interest for accord-
ing to the undisputed testimony of Mr. Bishop, 
he erected the fence merely to prevent the escape 
of his livestock to the east, and he did not attempt 
to erect a boundary line between the properties 
now involved or to settle any doubt or uncertainty 
as to the location of the true boundary line. 
According to defendant and his father, from whom 
defendant deraigns his title, they had merely 
assumed that the fence that had &.xisted at the 
time defendant's father purchased the property, 
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was on the boundary line. The theory under which 
a boundary line is established by long acquies-
cence along an existing fence line is founded on 
the doctrine that the parties erect the fence to 
settle some doubt or uncertainty which they n1ay 
have as to 'the location of the true boundary, and 
they compromise their differences by agreeing to 
accept the fence line as the limiting line of their 
respective lands. The mere fact that a fence hap-
pens to be put up and neither party does anything 
about it for a long period of time will not ,establish 
it as the true boundary. Peterson v. Johnson, 84 
Utah 89, 34 P.2d 679; Tripp v. Bagley, Supra." 
In the instant case, there is evidence that William S. 
Ringwood had his property surveyed a short time before 
his death and that some of the survey stakes were still 
in place when the subsequent survey was made by the 
plaintiffs. However, for several months before and at 
the time the cabin was constructed upon the Ringwood 
property, and for a. few months thereafter, Mr. Ringwood 
was confined to his home in Salt Lake City with a heart 
condition and apparently knew nothing about the con-
struction of the cabin. From all the evidence in the case, 
none of the plaintiffs knew that the cabin had been built 
upon their property until the survey was made approxi-
mately two years before the time of the trial. Imn1edi-
ately upon discovery of that fact, they contacted the 
defendant and requested that the cabin be re1noved. 
There had never been any dispute about the boundary 
line although defendant tried to establish some conver-
sation between Mr. Bradford, who never appeared as 
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the record owner of the property, and Harold Ringwood, 
'vho at the ti1ne of the alleged conversation, was not the 
owner of the Ringwood property, with respect to the 
boundary line. Harold Ringwood denies that he had 
ever had such a conversation but did state that he had 
talked to the defendant about the cabin after the last 
survey had been made. The defendant on cross-examina-
tion when asked if she had heard any conversation with 
respect to the boundary could not state that she had. 
As in the Glen v. Whitney case, supra, the fence on 
the Ringwood property was put up purely for keeping 
sheep from traversing on the Ringwood property. F'or a 
few years prior to the construction of the cabin and for 
the period subsequent to that time, apparently no work 
was done on the fence to keep it in condition by either of 
the adjoining land owners. The defendant i~ her brief, 
page 13, indicates the activity of the plaintiffs with 
respect to the boundary line when he says that nothing 
but silence has been heard from the respondents and 
their predecessors for a period of 18 years since the 
cabin was constructed near the fence line. This was true 
for about 16 years but after the survey, the plaintiffs 
definitely requested the defendant to remove her cabin. 
The two properties are located as testified to, in a woody 
area in Emigration Canyon. The plaintiffs' testimony 
indicates that there is a considerable amount of brush 
and trees between the cabins which were on the Ringwood 
property and the cabin constructed by the defendant's 
predecessor. The pictures of the defendant's cabin 
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ad1ni tted in to evidence, though taken in the winter time, 
indicate the nature of the brush. At the time the defend-
ant's cabin was constructed on the property, a survey 
had been 1nade of the plaintiffs' property and Mr. Brad-
ford, who was constructing the cabin, could have readily 
determined the boundary line if he had exerted a little 
effort to do so. ~Ir. Ringwood undoubtedly knew the 
location of the boundary line and would have, no doubt, 
objected to the construction of the cabin on this location 
had he been on the premises at any time when the same 
\vas being constructed, but as previously indica ted, he 
did not return to the Canyon property at all after his 
heart attack in the late summer of 1933, and knew nothing 
about the cabin or its location. 
There isn't any evidence that there was ever any 
dispute between the parties with respect to the boundary 
line or any actual discussion of it until after the survey 
\Vas made approximately two years prior to the filing of 
the lawsuit. There is no evidence whatever that there 
was any discussion between Mr. and Mrs. Willian H. 
Ringwood and the defendant and her predecessors in title 
at all. It is undisputed that the fence was old and broken 
down and covered only a portion of the distance between 
plaintiffs' South boundary line and plaintiffs' North 
boundary line when defendant's cabin was built and when 
defendant secured her property and that it did not reach 
to either boundary line. However, defendant seeks to 
have the Court estabiish a boundary line by acquiescence 
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for a substantial portion of the line claimed where there 
has never been any fence line and no use shown of the 
property. 
The fence line as it existed was neither parallel to 
the actual line nor was it even close to it. Mr. Bradford 
who bu~lt the cabin apparently picked out the only flat 
place where a cabin could be constructed and built it with-
out respect to boundary locations. 
The fence was not, subsequent to any dispute between 
adjoining landowners, nor at any time, erected to resolve 
any dispute or difference between the adjoining land-
owners with respect to their boundary, and defendant 
has failed entirely to prove the necessary facts to estab-
lish her title to the property on which the cabin is located 
under the doctrine of establishment of a boundary line 
by acquiescence. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion the respondents respectfully submit 
that this court should enter its order confirming the 
findings, conclusions and decree of the District Court, 
requiring the defendant appellant to remove her cabin 
from the property of the piaintiffs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LAWRENCE L. SUMMERHAYS, 
Attorney for Respondents. 
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